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l'.BSTRACT 
Belief consolidation schemes in AI can be viewed as 
three dimensional languages, consisting of a syntax 
(e.g. probabilities or certainty Factors), a calculus 
(e.g. Bayesian rules or CF combination rules), and a 
semantics (i.e. cognitive interpretations of 
competing formalisms). This paper studies the 
underlying rationality of those languages on the 
syntax and calculus grounds. In particular, the 
paper presents the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism Theorem, 
which explicitly defines the class of real-life 
problems of expertise that have a rational CF 
interpretation. Some implications of the theorem to 
the relationship between the CF and the Bayesian 
languages and the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence 
are presented. Finally, the paper discusses the 
implications of the theorem on the science and 
practice of rule-based knowledge engineering. 
1. INTRODIJCTION 
In order for a computer program to be a plausible 
�odel of a (mora or less) rational process of human 
expertise, the program should be capable of repres­
enting beliefs in a language that is (more or less) 
calibrated with a well-specified normative criterion, 
e.g. the axioms of Subjective Probability [15], the 
Theory of Confir.nation [4], formal Logic, etc. 
According to Shafer & Tversky, the building blocks· of 
a probabilistic language are syntax, calculus, and 
semantics [18]. The� is a set of numbers, 
co�only referred to as Degrees of Belief (e.g. 
standard probabilities or Certainty Factors), which 
are used to parameterize uncertain facts, inexact 
rules, and competing hypotheses. Typically, a set of 
atomic Degrees of Belief (COB's) is elicited directly 
from a human expert, while compound COB's are compu­
ted through a set of operators collectively known as 
a �elief calculus. Finally, the semaptics of the 
language can be viewed as a mapping from a real-life 
domain of expertise onto the probabilistic language. 
Th!s mapping provides a cognitive interpretation as 
well as descriptive face-validity to both the syntax 
and the calculus dimensions of the language. 
Given the critical role that a probabilistic language 
plays in determining both the low-level mechanics and 
the high-level ordinal ranking of the recommendations 
of an expert system, it is clear that the implicit 
rationality of the language is directly related to 
both the internal and external validities of computer 
based expertise. By •rationality' we refer here to 
the normative criteria of consistency and Complete­
ness (e.g. de Finatti, Savage [15]), as well as the 
psychometric criteria of Reliability and Validity 
[Wallsten,2l]. we argue that the performance of any 
expert, whether a human being or a computer program, 
should be evaluated and rated along those lines. 223 
The two mainstream probabilistic languages in AI are 
the no�ative Subjective 3ayesian school and the 
Certainty Factors (CF) ·�ovement,' the latter being 
representative of a wide variety of descriptive 
calculi of uncertainty. It seems that the CF method 
is currently the most widely used probabilistic lang­
uage in applied expert systems, primarily due to the 
popularity of such CF-based shells as EMYCIN, M.l and 
Texas Instrument's Personal Consultant. Bayesian 
inference has been traditionally much less popular, 
with the exception of some notable examples, e.g. 
PROSPECTOR [7]. Recently, new heuristic techniques 
designed to cope with the computational complexity of 
a complete Bayesian design are emerging, giving rise 
to the neo-Bayesian concept of heuristic 'Bayesian 
inference nets' [Pearl,l3]. 
Notwithstanding the critical importance of exploring 
the rational boundaries of expert systems, few 
studies have compared the CF and Bayesian languages 
on rational as wall as cognitive grounds. 
Furthermore, there exist a number of commonly held 
misconceptions regarding the state of the art of AI­
based belief representation techniques, such as the 
following two conjectures: 
Cl: Classical Bayesian methods are either too 
simplistic or too complex: in order for a Bayesian 
updating procedure to be computationally feasible, 
strict statistical independence must prevail. This 
requirement is rarely mat in practice, where 
interaction effects among clues and hypotheses make 
the Bayesian solution unmanageable on combinatorial 
grounds. The CF calculus, on the other hand, does 
not explicitly require that the facts/hypotheses 
space be statistically independent, and hence can be 
used to modal realistically complicated problems that 
defy a normative Bayesian interpretation. 
C2: Both the Bayesian and the CF calculi are special 
cases of the general Dempster-Shafer Theory of 
Evidence [10]. Hence, they should be construed as 
two alternative and competing probabilistic 
languages, each specialized to deal with a particular 
class of problems and probabilistic designs. 
Toward the end of the paper we will suggest a new and 
rather surprising interpretation of both Cl and C2. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 
2 presents an axiomatic description of the notion 
'domain of expertise.' Section 3 repeats the 
original probabilistic interpretation of CF's, as 
given by Shortliffe and Buchanan in (19]. Section 4 
presents three lemmas that are further integrated 
into the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism Theorem (all 
proofs, along with two additional lemmas, may be 
found in [16], which is available from the author). 
sections 5 and 6 discuss the implications of the 
t::eore:n on t�e scie
-
nce and practice or r'.Jle-based 
knowledge Engineer:r.g. Section 7 concludes with 
!uture research d:rections. 
Tte Endomorphism :::eorem can be viewed as an 
integrated theory t::at consolidates many features or 
Adams [1], Heckerman [12], Prada (14], and Shortliffe 
& Buchanan [19]. At the same time, unlike the ad-hoc 
nature or some or those contributions, the normative 
premise of this very general and domain-independent 
theorem requires no mora than the standard savagajda 
Finetti axioms or subjective probability (15]. 
The contribution of the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism 
T�eorem stems from three propositions that will be 
addressed in what follows: 
a The theorem explicitly defines the rational 
boundaries of probabilistic rule-based expert 
system architectures. 
a The theorem shows that the commonly believed 
conjectures Cl and C2 are misconceptions. 
• The theorem points to new research direct ions 
that may promote a mora rational practice of 
knowledge engineering. 
2. AXIOMATIC DEFINITION OP THE 'DOMaiN QP EXPERTISI' 
A 'domain ot expertise' (e.g. medical diagnosis) is 
viewed hera as a sUbset V of an n-dimansional 
propositional space s, where each dimension is 
interpreted as an attribute of the domain (e. g. chest 
pain, headache, allergy, etc. ). Furthermore, each 
attribute can be instantiated as either an hypothesis 
(e.g, a disease) or as a piece ot evidence (e. g. a 
symptom). This non-unique interpretation, which may 
vary across experts and contexts, is termed a 
'subjective instantiation' of the space v. 
we also assume that there exists a (possibly 
transcendental) joint distribution function F, 
F: v -> (0,1]. Although we don't have direct access 
to F, there exists a domain expert who is capable of 
making judgments that can be further interpreted as a 
subjective function BEL which approximates r. 
BEL : 2 5 -> R is a function of F, W, E, and L, 
defined as follows: W is the set of all beliefs and 
experiences of the human domain expert. E is the 
elicitation procedure designed to unravel those 
beliefs. L is a probabilistic language designed to 
encode elicited beliefs, 
In order to avoid the apologetic debate of whether or 
not the function F exists, we nota that F is 
presented here primarily for the sake of clear 
exposition . In fact, the relationship between BEL 
and F is at the canter of an intensified 
philosophical debate that has been qoinq strong tor 
more than 300 years. In short, under a Bayesian 
interpretation (e.g. Ramsey), BEL • P • F, where P is 
the standard savage/de Finetti subjective probability 
function. Objectivists (like Popper) arqua that F 
stands aloof from P (or, for that matter, from any 
personal BEL), and, hence, in general, P +F. 
Logisicists (e. g. Carnap) would oparationalize BEL 
t�rough the Theory of Confirmation (4] and its 
contemporary AI interpretation BEL • cr. 224 
Finally, pragmatic Bayesians (like myself) feel �hat 
BEL s P is our best shot at F, a shot whose accuracy 
is directly related to the operational character­
istics of the elicitation procedure designed to 
construct P. since P is subject to an internal 
axiomatic system, we term IBEL - PI an 'internal 
bias• and !BEL - Fi an 'external bias. • Attempts to 
reduce those biases are termed •aebiasing procedures• 
or 'corrective procedures• in the cognitive 
psychology literature (9,11]. 
We now present a set of definitions that partition v 
into three classes of problems that vary in terms of 
their computational (and cognitive) complexity. In 
other words, we observe that some problems that 
require expertise may be simple 'open and shut' 
cases, while other problems may be complicated and 
vague. In what follows, We wish to provide a more 
precise definition of this taxonomy of problems, 
based on the underlying complexity of their 
diagnostic structures. 
DEFINITIONS 
Let s be an n+l propositional space (X0,x1, • • .  ,Xnl 
defined over the sat {ralse,unknown,true) n+l, 
X•{h,el'''''en) is a subiective instantiation of 
S•(X0,x1, • • •  ,Xnl if X is a relabeling of s. Namely, 
xi�h for soma o < i < n, and xi-ej ror j�i. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that i•O. 
A subjective instantiation X • { h,e1, . . •  ,enl of s may 
be characterized by two conditioning& of BEL, namely 
BEL(hie1, • • •  ,en) and BEL(e1, • • •  ,enlhl, termed the 
predictive solution and the diagnostic structure of 
X, respectively. 
a X is a problem in S if 
l. X is a subjective instantiation of s. 
2. X has a diagnostic structure and a (possibly 
unknown) predictive solution. 
• The Domain gf Exparti$4 V: 
V • {X 1 X is a problem in S} 
e The sat of weakly QeCQmposable Problems WD: 
WD • (X I X E V and BEL(a1, • • •  ,enlh) • 
BEL(a11h) *···* BEL(en l h)} 
a The sat of pecomposable problems O: 
0 • {X 1 X is weakly decomposable and 
BEL(e1, • • •  ,en) • BEL(a1) * , , ,  * BEL(an)} 
a A problem X is holistic if X� V - wo 
corollary 
0 c: wo c: v c:: s 
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3, IHE RATIONAL INURPR!IAUON OF CERTAINTY FACTORS 
:�is section provi�es 3 brief account of the 
dafi�i�ion and i�te��etation of the Certainty 
:ac�ors La���age, s�a�ed originally in [19]. Given a 
pr=blem X =  (h,e)E �. ��· CF syntax approximates the 
predictive solut�on 3�L(h!e) through the difference 
tet�een a measure of lncreased belief (MB) and a 
�.eas ·o.Lre of increased disbelief (MD) in the hypothesis 
h in �i;ht of the clue e: 
-l "' CF(h,e) • MB(h,e) - MD(h,e) ' 1 
!he CF Calculus is a sat of operators designed to 
�ombine atomic CF's into compound CF's (e.g. compute 
3EL(h,a,b) from BEL(hla) and BEL(hlb)). In this 
�aper, we �ill �onfine the discussion to a subset of 
this calculus, denoted hereafter (Ml)-(M2): 
:19 ( h, ab) • [ 0 
MB(h,a) 
MD(h,ab) • 
it MD(h,ab)•l 
(Ml) 
+ MB(h,b)*(l-MB(h,a)) o.w. 
if MB(h,ab)•l 
(M2) 
MD(h,b)*(l-MD(h,a)) o.w. 
Shortliffa & Buchanan have also suggested a 
syntactical mapping from Bayesian probabilities to 
certainty Factors, defined as follows: 
{ l 
max{P(hla) ,P(h)} - P(h) 
-----------------------
1 - P(h) 
o.w. MB(h,a) • 
(Rl) 
1 it P(h)•O 
min(P(hla) ,P(h)} - P(h) (R2) 
MD(h,a) • o.w. 
-P(h) 
we term the (Rl)-(R2) mapping a rational interpreta­
� for three reasons. First, the mapping is 
intended to convey a certain degree of descriptive 
face-validity to the CF language. Second, it relates 
CF's to a subset of the real interval (0,1] which is 
consistent with the seven rational postulate& of 
savage and de Fi�etti (i.e. the axioms of subjective 
probability) • Third, our notion of a rational 
interpretation is consistent with Shortliffe & 
such<man who suggest : "behavior is irrational it 
actions taken or decisions made contradict the result 
that would be obtained under a probabilistic analysis 
ot the behavior" [19, p. 251]. 
Note that (Ml)-(M2) is very different from (Rl)-(R2). 
!he former pair of combination rules is the nucleus 
of the CF calculus, designed to compute the compound 
scrength ot belie! ot two piece• of evidence. The 
latter pair of definitions is an ex-post Bayesian 
interpretation of the notion of Certainty Factors 
��at has no operational bearing on CF-based 
elicitation and updating procedures. 
Also note in passing that both (Ml) and (M2) appear 
�o convey an (additive) rational sense: if you open 
the parentheses of (Ml) tor example, you obtain the 
sum of MB(h,a) and MB(h,b) minus their multiplicative 
interaction effect. Nonetheless, the fact t�at t�e 
CF calculus is sensitive to predictive interaction 
effects does not necessarily extend to the reco.gn­
ition of diagnostic interaction effects, as will be 
shown below in Lemma l (recall that in the context 
(instantiation) of h being an hypothesis and a baing 
a piece of evidence, BEL(hle) is termed 'predictive 
belief' and BEL(elh) is termed 'diagnostic belie!'). 
4. TRE CF·BAXESIAM !NQOMORPHISK TREOR!M 
Lemma l If the MB comb. rule (Ml) is used to approx­
i�ate the predictive solution of some problem X 6 V, 
then (Ml) is mutually consistent with the rational MB 
interpretation (Rl) it and only it X is decomposable. 
Lemma z If the MD comb. rule (M2) is used to approx­
imate the predictive solution of some problem X E v, 
then (M2) is mutually consistent with the rational MD 
interpretation (R2) it and only if X is decomposable. 
Lemma 3 If the CF calculus (Ml)-(M2) is used to app-
_roximata the predictive solution of some problem 
X E V, then (Ml)-(M2) is mutually and jointly 
consistent with the CF rational interpretation 
(Rl)-(R2) if and only if X is weakly decomposable. 
Lemma 1 Lemma 
� 
THI CF•BAYESIAN !NDOMORPBISK THEOREX 
Let CF be the set of all problems that have an app­
roximate predictive solution derived by the CF calc­
ulus (Ml)-(M2). Let V be the set of all problems 
that have an approximate predictive solution derived 
by a Bayesian calculus. Let T be the classical rati­
onal interpretation (Rl}•(R2). under these cond­
itions, T is an endomorphic transformation 
T : CF -> WD C: V, where WD is the subset of weakly 
decomposable problems in v. 
CF 
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5. DISCUSSION 
The CF-Bayesian Endomorphism Theorem says that the CF 
Calculus has a classical rational interpretation if 
and only if it is �estricted to weakly decomposable 
problems. In the ��ctorial illustration of the 
t�eorem, v is an holistic problem that is outside the 
rational scope of the CF language (e.g. v • (h, a, b} 
has a synergistic diagnostic structure, i.e. 
SEL(a,blh) > BEL(alh)*BEL(blh)). At the same time, 
however, v does have a (complicated) Bayesian 
solution, by virtue of its membership in v. This 
dichotomy means that one cannot trade rationality for 
efficiency, as is sometimes being done in AI. 
Furthermore, the likelihood that a real-life problem 
exists in wo is very small, due to the underlying 
complexity of problems that require expertise [5] . 
The preceding paragraph implies that most CF-based 
expert systems (hence, most applied expert systems) 
are inconsistent with their classical rational 
interpretation (Rl)-(R2). This finding is 
disturbing, because there exist reported instances 
where CF-based expert systems have achieved an 
impressive decision-making performance (8] . There 
may be (at least) two potential explanations for the 
disparity between the narrow normative foundation and 
the de-facto face-validity ot the CF language. 
First, I argue that experienced Knowledge Engineers 
intuitively ��ow that the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism 
Theorem is true, and, in tact, take advantage ot it. 
In particular, designers ot complicated expert 
systems often teal that the more granular the 
knowledge-base, the higher is the validity ot the 
system (2] . In the context ot the present theory, 
this heuristic amounts to augmenting an evidence 1 
hypotheses inference net with a multitude ot sub 
hypotheses and intermediate states, designed to 
partition the knowledge-base and achieve a higher 
degree ot granularity. This judicious decomposition 
is done in an attempt to explicitly account tor 
interaction effects, and, thereby, induce more 
conditional independence on the evidence 1 hypotheses 
space ([5] , [13] , (16] , (22] ). 
In the context ot the present theory, we can describe 
this practice as followe: when a CF knowledge 
engineer faces an holistic problem v which is outside 
the scope ot a rational interpretation, he or she 
first modifies the diagnostic structure ot the 
original problem, thus creating a transformation trom 
v to dE WD, which is a rational CF territory. It 
there exists a problem d whose diagnostic structure 
is indeed a plausible (weak) decomposition ot v, a 
CF-based system applied to d is likely to provide a 
(close) rational belief representation to v as well. 
The second explanation ot the CF descriptive 1 norm­
ative contrast may be that the original rational 
interpretation ot Certainty Factors (Rl)-(R2) is 
subject to doubt, as was also noted by Heckerman 
[12] . In other words, it seems that the notion ot 
CF's is indeed a novel idea that deserves a serious 
look, especially on practical and descriptive groun­
ds. Indeed, the tact that the CF movement has been 
going strong tor more than a decade in spite ot its 
unrealistically narrow rational interpretation sugg­
ests that the model is basically powerful although 
its normative foundation is weak. Hence, future 
basic research is needed to explore new interpreta­
tions to the CF language that will be more plausible 
on rational, cognitive, and philosophical grounds. 
Coniecture Cl Revisited We now turn to the casual 
conjecture Cl, which attributes the impracticality of 
the Bayesian approach vis a vis the CF language to 
the fact that real life domains ot expertise are not 
statistically independent. This statement, in my 
view, is based on a semantic rather than a 
substantive arqument. In particular, I have 
suggested elsewhere that statistical independence is 
not directly expressible in the CF formalism (16]. 
This is consistent with Shafer & TVersky, who observe 
that some mathematical properties are not 
translatable from one probabilistic language to 
another [18] . However, the tact that a particular 
characteristic ot the world cannot be described in a 
certain language does not necessarily imply that this 
characteristic in nonexistent. 
Tha statistical independence phenomenon is an 
attribute ot natura which stands aloot !rom the 
CF/Bayesian debate. To clarity this distinction, we 
may use an analogy trom physics. The presence or 
absence ot statistical independence is a unique 
property ot a domain ot expertise just as the mass is 
a unique physical property of a brick. 
Notwithstanding tha mass uniqueness, the weight ot' 
the brick varies with different scales (or on 
different planets) • Thus an absolute unique property 
ot natura may be mapped onto ditterent manifestations 
under dittarent circumstances. Similarly, the 
manifestation ot the independence property may be 
explicit in soma probabilistic languages and vague or 
even null in others. The crispness ot this 
expression should be construed as a property ot the 
language, not a property of nature. 
coniecture ca Revisited The C2 conjecture suggests 
that both the CF and the Bayesian languages are 
special cases ot the Dempster-Shatar Theory ot 
Evidence. Although this premise is indeed correct, 
this truth is quite dittarent trom its popular 
interpretation. That the Bayesian desiqn is a 
spacial case of the Dempster-shatar modal is a 
trivial corollary that can be found in (19]. 
Similarly, Gordon ' Shortlitte gave a Shafarian 
baliet interpretation to the CF calculus. They than 
procaadad to conclude that •the Dempster-shafer 
combination rule includes the Bayesian and the CF 
functions as special cases [ll, p. 273].• 
In my view, the popular interpretation ot this 
correct argument is as follows: 
226 
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:towever, in light. of the CF-Bayesian Endom orphism 
Theorem, a more accurate description of the 
CFj9ayesianjShafer relationships is as follows: 
This view suggests a new Bayesian interpretation of 
the controversial subadditivity property of CF's that 
Gordon & Shortliffe alluded to in (10]. This 
pragmatic interpretation, which is beyond the scope 
of this paper, may be found in (16]. In short, our 
analysis indicates that within the subset wo, CF's 
are remarkably Bayesian after all. Outside the 
subset wo, the CF language may have a variety of 
free-fo� and appealing descriptive interpretations. 
At the same time, those ad-hoc interpretations will 
not be accountable or testable on rational grounds, 
if only for the reason that a rational CF 
interpretation currently does not exist outside we. 
of course, this restriction may be lifted if the 
original interpretation (Rl)-(R2) is modified or 
extended in order to cover a larger superset of we. 
6. IMPLICATIONS ON �WLIDGI ENGINJ!RING 
several authors have stressed the fact that most 
real-life domains of expertise include problems that 
are 'dependant• (Pearl) , 'adjacent• (Davis), or 
•holistic' (Schocken) .  Clearly, all those 
definitions basically imply that the diagnostic 
structure of realistically complex problems is not 
weakly decomposable. This observation has far­
reaching computational implications which may be 
su�arized in the following proposition, which has 
not yet been proven rigorously: 
Proposition: If a problem {h,e1 • • •  en} is holistic, 
than the computation of its predictive solution 
BEL ( h l e1, • • •  ,en> is NP-Complete. 
Heuristic argument: This proposition is based on the 
intuition that an n-cities Travelling Salesman 
Problem (TSP) is reducible to the Integer Programming 
(I?) formulation of BEL(hla1, • • •  ,en>' provided that 
such plausible formulation exists. The objective 
function of the IP modal will be based on a log­
arithmic transformation of BEL(hla1, • • •  ,anl which 
amounts to a linear combination ot all the possible 
interaction effects within subsets of the 
(h,e1, • • •  ,enl space. Each individual interaction 
effect is m ultiplied by an integer 0-1 variable that 
determines whether or not the interaction obtains. 
Furthermore, it is felt that the typical TSP const­
raint designed to avoid a sub-tour among k<n cities 
can be mapped onto the IP constraint that given that 
X is holistic, the computation of BEL cannot afford 
to disregard a dependency ot degree k within 
(h , e1, ••• ,ek)• Those 2n logical constraints will 
force the appropriate 0-1 variables to be set to 0 or 
1, thus dete�ining whether or not the respective 
interaction effect should enter the computation of 
BEL(hie1, ... ,an) in the objective funct ion . 
we now return to the implications of the CF-Sayesian 
Endomorphism rheorem on knowledge engineering in 
light of the proposition just presented. In 
particular, we wish to focus on the key question that 
we ought to address, namely: how can a rule-based 
expert system compute the predictive solution of an 
holistic problem. Basically, there seem to be three 
alternative options: 
1. Apply a rule-based algorithm as though the problem 
in not holistic: 
2. Devise a new, non rule-based holistic algorithm: 
_, - --:,--- ----- --- --
3. Transform the holistic proble m Q into a more 
complicated proble m Q' that nonetheless is 
( roughly} weakly decomposable. Then apply a rule­
based algorithm to Q'. 
Option 1, which basically amounts to fudging, is, in 
my opinion, the leading practice among practitioners 
of rule-based expert system shells (this intuitive 
proposition is not supported by any firm empirical 
evidence} . Moreover, the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism 
Theorem shows that it doesn't really matter if you 
use a decomposable Bayesian or a CF approach : both 
fail to handle holistic diagnostic structures, 
although the latter implicitly claims that it does. 
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Option 2 is too ;cod to be true. The existence of 
s'.lch algori tlun ·•ould imply that a polynomial 
algorit�� was fou�d to the TSP. In light of Cook's 
::-.eorem [6], t�is ·.,ill i:nply that P•NP, amounting to 
t�e :nest staggeri�g finding in Complexity Theory, and 
a very unlikely one. 
!his leaves us with the pragmatic option 3, in which, 
in my opinion, we ought to invest our intellectual 
efforts. It we manage to construct a plausible 
decomposition Q' ot Q, than we can safely apply a 
r•.1le-based predictive solution to Q', whose distance 
from the optimal solution is IBEL(Q' IE')-BEL(QIE) 1. 
some ideas allout how such decomposition can be 
carried out may be found in the seminal work of Pearl 
[13] as well as in Charniak's notion of 'intermediate 
states' (5]. 
It we view the optimal solution of Q as a complete 
combinatorial Bayesian design, and the rule-based 
solution of Q' as a heuristic solution ot Q, we may 
bring upon some very strong findings trom the 
probabilistic analysis ot the TSP that followed the 
1971 �P-completenesa revolution. For example, there 
is a greedy algoritlun that solves the TSP in 
po lynomial time, giving a solution that may not lle 
optimum but is guaranteed to be no worse than twice 
the optimum path (due to Christofidas of the Imperial 
College of Science and Technology in London). 
Furthermore, if some very plausible assumptions are 
made regarding the layout of the cities (viz, the 
topology of the diagnostic structure of the problem), 
this error can become as small as 5t (due to 
Beardwood of Oxford, and also Karp). 
7 • CONCLOSIOll 
This paper presents some analytical results that are 
emerging from an elaborate research program on 
uncertainty in AI. One important aspect of this 
undertaking that was not covered here is the 
investigation of the semantical (cognitive) dimension 
ot the CF and the Bayesian languages. This effort, 
which involves a large-scale experiment that utilizes 
experts as well as (CF and Bayesian) expert systems 
as subjects, is already underway. We believe that 
this research will improve significantly our 
understanding of the philosophical foundations of 
expert systems as well as the practicality ot various 
approaches to uncertainty in AI. This effort may 
promote the formulation of a synthetic approach to 
Knowledge Engineering, i.e. one that combines the 
attractive descriptive features ot the cr language 
with the normative rigor of a Bayesian design. It is 
hoped that this approach will strike a balance 
between preserving the intuitive element of human 
expertise, and, at the same time, entorcinq a certain 
degree ot normative rationality. 
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